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How can competitive authoritarian politics survive inside the European Union, a regional organization built on liberal rules and democratic conditionality? While identity politics shapes politics in general, in a liberal environment like the European Union, strongman support grows when political conflict in a member state is organized around threat activation, not identity attachment. Threat activation is framing out-groups as dangers that call for protection, while identity cultivation strengthens in-group attachment without necessarily producing strongman support. Using survey data from 15 European Union member states, with a focus on Hungary, the findings across multiple model specifications show that threat activation, expressed through the perception of out-groups as threats, is consistently associated with support for a leader unconstrained by elections or parliamentary rules in both Hungary and the broader European Union. By contrast, national and European identity attachment is weak and does not consistently predict support for a strongman. The findings show that support for competitive authoritarian rule inside the European Union is organized less through identity attachment than through threat activation that recasts external scrutiny as danger.
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Fidelis Atnadu David (2026) studied this question.
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