How Rule Consequentialism Avoids Boonin’s Implausible Conclusion

David Boonin's Implausible Conclusion says a person (Wilma) who deliberately chooses to conceive a blind child when she could, at no significant cost to herself, have conceived a sighted child instead does nothing morally wrong.Boonin argues that we should accept his Implausible Conclusion, in part because every moral theory that avoids that conclusion has other implications that are even less palatable.I argue that Rule Consequentialism can avoid Boonin's Implausible Conclusion without leading to greater absurdities.My focus is Boonin's fifth premise in the non-identity argument, or the claim that "if an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not wrong."I introduce an imaginary case where an act that wrongs no one seems to be very wrong.This cases involves a future refusal to avoid imminent human extinction by costlessly launching a Generation Starship programme whereby humanity would continue in space.I argue that this refusal is intuitively wrong, even though it wrongs no one.Any acceptable moral theory must accommodate this intuition.This requirement makes Rule Consequentialism more impersonal and demanding, which enables Rule Consequentialism to condemn Wilma's choice, solve the non-identity Problem, and avoid Boonin's Implausible Conclusion.