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This paper offers a constitutional perspective on monetary governance in the euro area. It argues that recurrent crises have not only expanded the European Central Bank’s scope of action but, through the institutionalisation of discretion, have also reshaped the constitutional framework within which it operates. While existing literature already documents the institution’s crisis-driven evolution – particularly through the increasing relevance of secondary objectives – this paper aims to develop a coherent conceptual framework to clarify the constitutional mechanisms at stake, providing a basis to assess whether the euro area can sustain a genuine monetary constitution. To carry out this analysis, we first set out a theoretical and operational framework, grounding a genuine constitution in principles of rules, justification, and consent. Then, we aim to translate these dimensions into a single constitutional bundle of observable constraints. This approach helps distinguish between constitutional adaptation and erosion by tracking how different elements change over time and how exceptional measures either stay limited or become normalised.
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Faria et al. (2026) studied this question.
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